It has to be said that Belgium is still struggling to understand these rules on the protection of the child’s best interests. In any case, we must now take a closer look at a case in which the Belgian courts take the view that the best interests of the child only come into play if the child is the defendant in a case such as this, where the father has been ordered to leave the country and has also been issued with an entry ban. There is no mention of what led to him being ordered to leave the country with a re-entry ban on top of that, but one must assume that he has been charged with or convicted of serious offences.
He has a Belgian spouse and the couple have a minor child together. The child is a Belgian national. The Belgian court specialising in immigration law takes the view that it is HE who is the accused, not the child. That the court is only required to take the child’s best interests into account if the case specifically concerned the child and the child was in the dock, charged alongside his father. As long as that is not the case, there is no need to take the child’s best interests into account.
The Court does not agree with this view. One need only read the responses in paragraphs 27, 31, 32 and 36 in isolation. The Belgian argument is completely dismantled. On the one hand, the child’s best interests must be taken into account BEFORE a decision on removal is made, not afterwards; on the other hand, taking the child’s best interests into account is an OBLIGATION, not an optional matter, in all cases where there is even the slightest hint of children being involved in one way or another, and, thirdly, one cannot construct a narrative suggesting that the child’s best interests are only relevant if the child is personally the subject of a deportation order.
Directive 2008/115, referred to in the judgment, applies in Denmark as it forms part of the Schengen cooperation. The Directive is known as the ‘Returning Directive’ and deals with how Member States are to conduct themselves in cases concerning the removal of undesirable persons.
Paragraph 27 of the judgment states explicitly that the mere fact that the parent who is a national of the country is capable of caring for the child alone may form part of the overall assessment of the case, but it cannot stand on its own. Despite this admonition, Denmark relied on precisely that single point to justify the removal of numerous fathers and mothers of minor children with dual Danish citizenship right up until October 2022. This was the sole focus, and nothing else was taken into account.
The Court’s ruling had no impact on Danish practice.
Link to the judgment in Case C-112/20, M.A. v. Etat Belge:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2020CJ0112
Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 32008L0115
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – SECTION III – EQUALITY – Article 24 – Rights of the child:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... :12007P024
Full AO1 walk-through
-
Kim P. Nyberg
- Indlæg: 3510
- Tilmeldt: 02.02.2009 11:41:42
- Geografisk sted: Herning
- Kontakt:
Re: Full AO1 walk-through
Senest rettet af Kim P. Nyberg 30.08.2026 16:01:59, rettet i alt 1 gang.
Frivillig rådgiver i Ægteskab Uden Grænser
-
Kim P. Nyberg
- Indlæg: 3510
- Tilmeldt: 02.02.2009 11:41:42
- Geografisk sted: Herning
- Kontakt:
Re: Full AO1 walk-through
‘Clear all the desks, and do it NOW!!’ – the command almost echoes through the corridors of the Danish Immigration Service, even though the two joined cases we are now going to look at are not against Denmark. It is May 2022; the cases are against Spain and are the direct cause of the change in practice in Denmark, which took effect on 14 October 2022 at 11.58 am. The parties to the cases have the rather unwieldy initials XU and QP.
The fact is that when the Court of Justice issues a ruling, it applies immediately in all Member States, and not just in the Member State to which it relates. In practice, the word ‘immediately’ is not given particular weight, as Member States would prefer first to have the opportunity to sit down and draw up a national interpretation of the judgment. In other words: how do WE in OUR country understand this ruling, and then put that down on paper. But as a matter of principle, the rulings apply from the very moment they are published on the Court’s website. And one cannot use the fact that a particular judgment is not yet available in one’s own language as an excuse.
As mentioned, we’re heading to Spain, and this ruling bears a striking resemblance to something we’ve seen before in this series. The only difference is that, on this occasion, the Court of Justice makes it clear that it is aware that Member States have not fully grasped all these issues concerning the best interests of the child, and so the Court sets it out in no uncertain terms so that there can be no misunderstanding.
In the XU case, we have a third-country national, a Spanish Union citizen and a child of joint parentage holding Spanish nationality. In the QP case, the cast of characters is similar, but with the added complication that the third-country national has brought a child from a previous relationship into the new relationship.
It is clear from the judgment that the Spanish authorities wish to have these two adult third-country nationals deported from the country, and in this context they demand that the children and the parents who are EU citizens be deported as well. Under Spanish law, it is in fact a requirement that the couples remain together at all times. However, the Court points out that Spanish law cannot be enforced in other countries, so they cannot in fact dictate that the two core families, separately, MUST live together in another country. Furthermore, Member States do not have the authority to deport their own nationals. So the Spanish authorities should put an end to this practice.
We are then given – in a very educational manner – a recap of the implications of previous judgments. That the best interests of the child are the absolute top priority in ALL cases involving minors; that a third-country national who is the parent of such a child cannot simply be deported – not even to another Member State – without the best interests of the child being given primary consideration. And so on.
Friday 14 October 2022 was then the day on which the two Danish ministries, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Immigration and Integration, issued a joint change in practice just as staff in the central administration and various agencies were heading home for the weekend. The change in practice was intended to interpret this ruling. What a clean-up it led to. Although, as mentioned, the judgment was not directed at Denmark specifically, the Danish authorities were indirectly given a verbal slap on the wrist by the Court of Justice. For the practice the Danish authorities had followed of deporting third-country parents on the basis of minute legal technicalities, and justifying these deportations solely on the grounds that the Danish parent could simply look after the child, was absolutely illegal. So now it was time to sort things out. The Danish Immigration Service was required to reopen, on its own initiative, all cases in which a third-country parent had been deported on these grounds since the Chavez-Vilchez ruling was published. In cases dating back further, people had to make their own appeals. This created a serious rush of work at the Danish Immigration Service. Within a very short space of time, they were faced with several thousand cases where they had to politely apologise to those affected for the mess, and not everyone took the apology in good spirits. For some, the deportation was the direct reason why they were no longer in a relationship with their Danish partner or spouse, nor did they have any plans to return. The treatment they had received from the Danish authorities was a direct deterrent. Denmark’s strict immigration policy had shown its teeth, and they did not want to be subjected to it again.
For others, it was a huge victory, with confetti flying and champagne corks popping in their small homes as they realised the significance and far-reaching impact that this change in practice had – and still has.
For yet others, the motto was that when something sounds too good to be true, you should probably take it with a pinch of salt. They simply didn’t believe it. After all, they were used to the strict immigration policy, and now the whole thing had been thoroughly dismantled.
At Christiansborg (housing the Danish Parliament), one might have thought this would provoke such fury that the roof would be blown off the entire building. To everyone’s great surprise, it was completely silent. It seemed as though the politicians hadn’t even noticed that something was happening which they’d never in their wildest dreams imagined could happen.
Or perhaps they were simply watching in silence as a large part of the strict immigration policy had gone as limp as a wet dishcloth. Without being able to do anything about it.
As early as the following week, we saw the result of this new change in practice. Cases began to trickle in where the Danish Immigration Service had reversed previous decisions. Now these third-country nationals were free to return to Denmark and apply for a residence permit on the basis of their child in common. What’s more, the application was made free of charge.
Were the staff at the Danish Immigration Service red-faced? Perhaps they ought to have been, given the huge blunder they’d been making for several years. But that wasn’t the case. Instead, there were broad smiles amidst the chaos surrounding all these cases, because they could now give a positive response instead of a negative one.
Even today, we still occasionally come across cases where people pause and ask whether it can really be true that it has become SO easy. To this, we can only reply that yes, it really is true.
Link to the judgment in the joined cases C-451/19 and C-532/19, Subdelegación del Gobierno en Toledo v XU and QP:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2019CJ0451
Opinion of Advocate General P. Pikamäe delivered on 13 January 2022:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2019CC0451
The change in practice dated 14 October 2022, issued by the Ministry of Justice in collaboration with the Ministry of Immigration and Integration:
https://nyidanmark.dk/en-GB/News-Front- ... nification
The fact is that when the Court of Justice issues a ruling, it applies immediately in all Member States, and not just in the Member State to which it relates. In practice, the word ‘immediately’ is not given particular weight, as Member States would prefer first to have the opportunity to sit down and draw up a national interpretation of the judgment. In other words: how do WE in OUR country understand this ruling, and then put that down on paper. But as a matter of principle, the rulings apply from the very moment they are published on the Court’s website. And one cannot use the fact that a particular judgment is not yet available in one’s own language as an excuse.
As mentioned, we’re heading to Spain, and this ruling bears a striking resemblance to something we’ve seen before in this series. The only difference is that, on this occasion, the Court of Justice makes it clear that it is aware that Member States have not fully grasped all these issues concerning the best interests of the child, and so the Court sets it out in no uncertain terms so that there can be no misunderstanding.
In the XU case, we have a third-country national, a Spanish Union citizen and a child of joint parentage holding Spanish nationality. In the QP case, the cast of characters is similar, but with the added complication that the third-country national has brought a child from a previous relationship into the new relationship.
It is clear from the judgment that the Spanish authorities wish to have these two adult third-country nationals deported from the country, and in this context they demand that the children and the parents who are EU citizens be deported as well. Under Spanish law, it is in fact a requirement that the couples remain together at all times. However, the Court points out that Spanish law cannot be enforced in other countries, so they cannot in fact dictate that the two core families, separately, MUST live together in another country. Furthermore, Member States do not have the authority to deport their own nationals. So the Spanish authorities should put an end to this practice.
We are then given – in a very educational manner – a recap of the implications of previous judgments. That the best interests of the child are the absolute top priority in ALL cases involving minors; that a third-country national who is the parent of such a child cannot simply be deported – not even to another Member State – without the best interests of the child being given primary consideration. And so on.
Friday 14 October 2022 was then the day on which the two Danish ministries, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Immigration and Integration, issued a joint change in practice just as staff in the central administration and various agencies were heading home for the weekend. The change in practice was intended to interpret this ruling. What a clean-up it led to. Although, as mentioned, the judgment was not directed at Denmark specifically, the Danish authorities were indirectly given a verbal slap on the wrist by the Court of Justice. For the practice the Danish authorities had followed of deporting third-country parents on the basis of minute legal technicalities, and justifying these deportations solely on the grounds that the Danish parent could simply look after the child, was absolutely illegal. So now it was time to sort things out. The Danish Immigration Service was required to reopen, on its own initiative, all cases in which a third-country parent had been deported on these grounds since the Chavez-Vilchez ruling was published. In cases dating back further, people had to make their own appeals. This created a serious rush of work at the Danish Immigration Service. Within a very short space of time, they were faced with several thousand cases where they had to politely apologise to those affected for the mess, and not everyone took the apology in good spirits. For some, the deportation was the direct reason why they were no longer in a relationship with their Danish partner or spouse, nor did they have any plans to return. The treatment they had received from the Danish authorities was a direct deterrent. Denmark’s strict immigration policy had shown its teeth, and they did not want to be subjected to it again.
For others, it was a huge victory, with confetti flying and champagne corks popping in their small homes as they realised the significance and far-reaching impact that this change in practice had – and still has.
For yet others, the motto was that when something sounds too good to be true, you should probably take it with a pinch of salt. They simply didn’t believe it. After all, they were used to the strict immigration policy, and now the whole thing had been thoroughly dismantled.
At Christiansborg (housing the Danish Parliament), one might have thought this would provoke such fury that the roof would be blown off the entire building. To everyone’s great surprise, it was completely silent. It seemed as though the politicians hadn’t even noticed that something was happening which they’d never in their wildest dreams imagined could happen.
Or perhaps they were simply watching in silence as a large part of the strict immigration policy had gone as limp as a wet dishcloth. Without being able to do anything about it.
As early as the following week, we saw the result of this new change in practice. Cases began to trickle in where the Danish Immigration Service had reversed previous decisions. Now these third-country nationals were free to return to Denmark and apply for a residence permit on the basis of their child in common. What’s more, the application was made free of charge.
Were the staff at the Danish Immigration Service red-faced? Perhaps they ought to have been, given the huge blunder they’d been making for several years. But that wasn’t the case. Instead, there were broad smiles amidst the chaos surrounding all these cases, because they could now give a positive response instead of a negative one.
Even today, we still occasionally come across cases where people pause and ask whether it can really be true that it has become SO easy. To this, we can only reply that yes, it really is true.
Link to the judgment in the joined cases C-451/19 and C-532/19, Subdelegación del Gobierno en Toledo v XU and QP:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2019CJ0451
Opinion of Advocate General P. Pikamäe delivered on 13 January 2022:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2019CC0451
The change in practice dated 14 October 2022, issued by the Ministry of Justice in collaboration with the Ministry of Immigration and Integration:
https://nyidanmark.dk/en-GB/News-Front- ... nification
Senest rettet af Kim P. Nyberg 30.08.2026 16:10:24, rettet i alt 1 gang.
Frivillig rådgiver i Ægteskab Uden Grænser
-
Kim P. Nyberg
- Indlæg: 3510
- Tilmeldt: 02.02.2009 11:41:42
- Geografisk sted: Herning
- Kontakt:
Re: Full AO1 walk-through
M.D. is a really bad man, if you ask the immigration authorities in Hungary. For as well as being a baker with bread shops at no fewer than four addresses, he has also been actively involved in helping illegal migrants enter the country. The Hungarian authorities regard human trafficking as a real, direct and serious threat to national security. So we’d like to see him thrown out of the country.
He himself is a third-country national and has lived in Hungary since May 2003. He lives with his Hungarian partner and their child. Things went wrong for him in connection with an extension of his residence permit in 2018. For the reason mentioned above, the authorities want him out, and it is stated in paragraph 37 of the judgment that “In such a case, the expulsion of the third-country national in question must therefore be ordered, without taking into account the third-country national’s family or personal circumstances.”
Following a period of administrative turmoil, during which the authorities did not carry out their work thoroughly enough initially and were therefore asked to redo it, he leaves Hungarian territory. He is issued with a 10-year entry ban. The question now is, firstly, whether the expulsion is correct in relation to the best interests of the child, and secondly, whether he can return to Hungary before the 10 years have elapsed.
The referring court, that is to say the national court which is referring the question to the Court of Justice, raises doubts regarding the aforementioned sentence in paragraph 37. It does so because, in the M.A. case, the Court of Justice rejected a similar line of reasoning outright and ruled that, where there are minor children, the child’s best interests MUST be given priority, and only then can the other factors be considered. It does not work the other way round.
The Court is, after all, very clear on this point. If a Member State does not have a law that complies with EU rules, Member States must not apply national law but must apply EU rules instead. And just as in the M.A. judgment, the Court of Justice criticises the Hungarian authorities for the fact that the entire deportation is unlawful because the child’s best interests were not considered first. M.D. must therefore be granted free access to re-enter the country and live with his small family.
Link to the judgment in Case C-528/21, M.D.:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2021CJ0528
Opinion of Advocate General M. Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered on 24 November 2022:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2021CC0528
Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 32008L0115
Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 47:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... :12007P047
He himself is a third-country national and has lived in Hungary since May 2003. He lives with his Hungarian partner and their child. Things went wrong for him in connection with an extension of his residence permit in 2018. For the reason mentioned above, the authorities want him out, and it is stated in paragraph 37 of the judgment that “In such a case, the expulsion of the third-country national in question must therefore be ordered, without taking into account the third-country national’s family or personal circumstances.”
Following a period of administrative turmoil, during which the authorities did not carry out their work thoroughly enough initially and were therefore asked to redo it, he leaves Hungarian territory. He is issued with a 10-year entry ban. The question now is, firstly, whether the expulsion is correct in relation to the best interests of the child, and secondly, whether he can return to Hungary before the 10 years have elapsed.
The referring court, that is to say the national court which is referring the question to the Court of Justice, raises doubts regarding the aforementioned sentence in paragraph 37. It does so because, in the M.A. case, the Court of Justice rejected a similar line of reasoning outright and ruled that, where there are minor children, the child’s best interests MUST be given priority, and only then can the other factors be considered. It does not work the other way round.
The Court is, after all, very clear on this point. If a Member State does not have a law that complies with EU rules, Member States must not apply national law but must apply EU rules instead. And just as in the M.A. judgment, the Court of Justice criticises the Hungarian authorities for the fact that the entire deportation is unlawful because the child’s best interests were not considered first. M.D. must therefore be granted free access to re-enter the country and live with his small family.
Link to the judgment in Case C-528/21, M.D.:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2021CJ0528
Opinion of Advocate General M. Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered on 24 November 2022:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2021CC0528
Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 32008L0115
Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 47:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... :12007P047
Senest rettet af Kim P. Nyberg 30.08.2026 16:13:51, rettet i alt 1 gang.
Frivillig rådgiver i Ægteskab Uden Grænser
-
Kim P. Nyberg
- Indlæg: 3510
- Tilmeldt: 02.02.2009 11:41:42
- Geografisk sted: Herning
- Kontakt:
Re: Full AO1 walk-through
Some of you are probably familiar with this case, whilst others may not be. We are once again heading to the Netherlands, where our main character is referred to as X. She is a Thai national and has been married to A, a Dutch national. Together they have a child, B.
B is a Dutch national but has never been to the Netherlands. He was born and raised in Thailand with his grandparents. Shortly after his birth, X returned to the Netherlands without the child.
The marriage between A and X is not going well. They therefore decide to divorce. As a result, X is deported from the Netherlands, but the very next day after her deportation, she reapplies for a residence permit on the basis of her child. The application was rejected. The authorities did not consider that she had a derived right of residence on the basis of the Chavez-Vilchez judgment.
The arguments put forward by X and the Dutch authorities respectively are set out in paragraphs 11–14 of the judgment. Among other things, X argues that she has always looked after the child and maintained contact with the child throughout the years, and that her mother is no longer able to look after the child for health reasons. Furthermore, contact between A and the child has been only sporadic, and X has been granted full custody by the Thai authorities.
The Dutch authorities are rather smirking of the whole affair. After all, one cannot look after a child who is several thousand kilometres away, and the claim about the grandmother has not been substantiated, so we do not believe it. Moreover, the ruling granting full custody has not been legalised, so the Dutch authorities are not really taking it seriously either.
The Court is tearing the whole thing apart. The Dutch authorities must not, in this way, indirectly deny their own nationals entry into the country. And that is effectively what they are doing by coming up with all these excuses. Nor is there any requirement that the third-country national must have lived with the child for the child’s entire life. Nor can the child be thrust into the arms of a father who has never had anything to do with the child and who has no interest in looking after it either.
This brings us back to the seven cases from the Chavez-Vilchez judgment, and the Court finds that the child and X fall under the same conditions that applied in Chavez-Vilchez. Consequently, the child must be allowed to enter the Netherlands and the mother must be granted a work and residence permit in that Member State.
Link to the judgment in Case C-459/20, X:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2020CJ0459
Opinion of Advocate General J. Richard de la Tour delivered on 16 June 2022:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2020CC0459
B is a Dutch national but has never been to the Netherlands. He was born and raised in Thailand with his grandparents. Shortly after his birth, X returned to the Netherlands without the child.
The marriage between A and X is not going well. They therefore decide to divorce. As a result, X is deported from the Netherlands, but the very next day after her deportation, she reapplies for a residence permit on the basis of her child. The application was rejected. The authorities did not consider that she had a derived right of residence on the basis of the Chavez-Vilchez judgment.
The arguments put forward by X and the Dutch authorities respectively are set out in paragraphs 11–14 of the judgment. Among other things, X argues that she has always looked after the child and maintained contact with the child throughout the years, and that her mother is no longer able to look after the child for health reasons. Furthermore, contact between A and the child has been only sporadic, and X has been granted full custody by the Thai authorities.
The Dutch authorities are rather smirking of the whole affair. After all, one cannot look after a child who is several thousand kilometres away, and the claim about the grandmother has not been substantiated, so we do not believe it. Moreover, the ruling granting full custody has not been legalised, so the Dutch authorities are not really taking it seriously either.
The Court is tearing the whole thing apart. The Dutch authorities must not, in this way, indirectly deny their own nationals entry into the country. And that is effectively what they are doing by coming up with all these excuses. Nor is there any requirement that the third-country national must have lived with the child for the child’s entire life. Nor can the child be thrust into the arms of a father who has never had anything to do with the child and who has no interest in looking after it either.
This brings us back to the seven cases from the Chavez-Vilchez judgment, and the Court finds that the child and X fall under the same conditions that applied in Chavez-Vilchez. Consequently, the child must be allowed to enter the Netherlands and the mother must be granted a work and residence permit in that Member State.
Link to the judgment in Case C-459/20, X:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2020CJ0459
Opinion of Advocate General J. Richard de la Tour delivered on 16 June 2022:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2020CC0459
Senest rettet af Kim P. Nyberg 30.08.2026 16:18:24, rettet i alt 1 gang.
Frivillig rådgiver i Ægteskab Uden Grænser
-
Kim P. Nyberg
- Indlæg: 3510
- Tilmeldt: 02.02.2009 11:41:42
- Geografisk sted: Herning
- Kontakt:
Re: Full AO1 walk-through
We return to Hungary, where two cases have been combined into a single judgment. In the first case, we meet NW, who married a Hungarian woman in 2004 and had a child with her the following year. He was granted a residence permit in the country on the basis of this marriage.
However, in 2021, the residence permit was suddenly revoked, and neither the immigration authorities nor NW himself could obtain an explanation. It was the “Office for the Protection of the Constitution” (hereinafter referred to simply as “the Office”) that had decided that the man posed a threat to national security, and they would not disclose the grounds for this because it was “classified information”. The Minister of the Interior backed the Office’s decision. The immigration authorities therefore had no choice but to tell the man that he was undesirable, whilst we have no idea why. The decision is so definitive that, according to the law, no consideration is given to his family circumstances.
The case will go before the local magistrates’ court, I presume. There, the judge is shrewd enough to say, ‘Hold on a moment’. The judge was, in fact, familiar with previous rulings from the Court of Justice, not least in cases involving minor children of the couple. The local judge therefore decides to put the case on hold and put some questions to the Court of Justice. These include (once again) whether the child’s best interests take precedence or whether deportation without regard to family circumstances takes precedence.
According to the Hungarian Supreme Court, the lower court is always entitled to receive these classified materials so that it can reach its own decision; however, as I read the judgment summary, the district court has been denied access to these documents for review. They have simply been given an order from above, which they must pass on.
In the second case, we have PQ, who entered the country as a professional footballer in 2005, met a Hungarian woman whom he married and had two children with. Both children are Hungarian nationals. He has been the primary carer for the children because he had the most time to devote to them.
Out of the blue, he then received a notice similar to the one NW also received. ‘We are not taking your family ties into account; you simply have to leave, and you must do so now,’ and you are given no justification whatsoever, other than that you are a threat to national security. This decision, too, was confirmed by the Minister for the Interior.
The Hungarian Government is raising objections in these cases. It argues, firstly, that Article 20 TFEU has no relevance whatsoever to the two cases, and secondly, that there is no relationship of dependency between PQ and his children. The Court refuses to address this and draws the Hungarian Government’s attention to the fact that it is the District Court which is hearing the case and is therefore familiar with all the details of it. The Government is not, and must therefore keep out of it. The Court of Justice must only consider the matters which the district court has submitted to it and the questions which that court has raised in relation to the cases.
Given that we are now aware of the outcome of previous judgments in the field of Article 20 TFEU, it will come as no surprise to anyone that the Court of Justice rules that the best interests of the child always come first and must be assessed first. Because there is a relationship of dependency between both NW and his children, and PQ and his children, NW and PQ are entitled to reside in Hungary under Article 20 TFEU, and the Hungarian authorities cannot deny them this right.
However, the case concerning PQ does not end here. There is another judgment to come in which he is the main figure.
Link to the judgment in the joined cases C-420/22, NW, and C-528/22, PQ:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2022CJ0420
Opinion of Advocate General J. Richard de la Tour delivered on 23 November 2023:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2022CC0420
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... :12007P047
However, in 2021, the residence permit was suddenly revoked, and neither the immigration authorities nor NW himself could obtain an explanation. It was the “Office for the Protection of the Constitution” (hereinafter referred to simply as “the Office”) that had decided that the man posed a threat to national security, and they would not disclose the grounds for this because it was “classified information”. The Minister of the Interior backed the Office’s decision. The immigration authorities therefore had no choice but to tell the man that he was undesirable, whilst we have no idea why. The decision is so definitive that, according to the law, no consideration is given to his family circumstances.
The case will go before the local magistrates’ court, I presume. There, the judge is shrewd enough to say, ‘Hold on a moment’. The judge was, in fact, familiar with previous rulings from the Court of Justice, not least in cases involving minor children of the couple. The local judge therefore decides to put the case on hold and put some questions to the Court of Justice. These include (once again) whether the child’s best interests take precedence or whether deportation without regard to family circumstances takes precedence.
According to the Hungarian Supreme Court, the lower court is always entitled to receive these classified materials so that it can reach its own decision; however, as I read the judgment summary, the district court has been denied access to these documents for review. They have simply been given an order from above, which they must pass on.
In the second case, we have PQ, who entered the country as a professional footballer in 2005, met a Hungarian woman whom he married and had two children with. Both children are Hungarian nationals. He has been the primary carer for the children because he had the most time to devote to them.
Out of the blue, he then received a notice similar to the one NW also received. ‘We are not taking your family ties into account; you simply have to leave, and you must do so now,’ and you are given no justification whatsoever, other than that you are a threat to national security. This decision, too, was confirmed by the Minister for the Interior.
The Hungarian Government is raising objections in these cases. It argues, firstly, that Article 20 TFEU has no relevance whatsoever to the two cases, and secondly, that there is no relationship of dependency between PQ and his children. The Court refuses to address this and draws the Hungarian Government’s attention to the fact that it is the District Court which is hearing the case and is therefore familiar with all the details of it. The Government is not, and must therefore keep out of it. The Court of Justice must only consider the matters which the district court has submitted to it and the questions which that court has raised in relation to the cases.
Given that we are now aware of the outcome of previous judgments in the field of Article 20 TFEU, it will come as no surprise to anyone that the Court of Justice rules that the best interests of the child always come first and must be assessed first. Because there is a relationship of dependency between both NW and his children, and PQ and his children, NW and PQ are entitled to reside in Hungary under Article 20 TFEU, and the Hungarian authorities cannot deny them this right.
However, the case concerning PQ does not end here. There is another judgment to come in which he is the main figure.
Link to the judgment in the joined cases C-420/22, NW, and C-528/22, PQ:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2022CJ0420
Opinion of Advocate General J. Richard de la Tour delivered on 23 November 2023:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2022CC0420
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... :12007P047
Senest rettet af Kim P. Nyberg 30.08.2026 16:23:23, rettet i alt 1 gang.
Frivillig rådgiver i Ægteskab Uden Grænser
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Kim P. Nyberg
- Indlæg: 3510
- Tilmeldt: 02.02.2009 11:41:42
- Geografisk sted: Herning
- Kontakt:
Re: Full AO1 walk-through
We now turn to a case that I have spent a great deal of time explaining, particularly on Facebook. If I say Stadt Wuppertal, I’m sure many of you will recognise it.
We are dealing with a woman who first entered Poland legally for the purpose of studying. From there, she travelled on to Germany a little later, where she settled in the German city of Wuppertal. However, the city’s population register will not recognise her residence, which they consider to be illegal. They justify this on the grounds that she has not applied for a visa for Germany.
We could stop here and put forward two arguments to support this. The first is that third-country nationals do not have an independent right to free movement within the Union, so in that respect one might well side with the city. On the other hand, we have an earlier ruling known as MRAX, which establishes that a visa for a country within the Schengen Area is, in principle, valid for the ENTIRE Schengen Area, and not just for the country for which it was issued. And since both Poland and Germany are part of this cooperation, there should be no obstacle to this woman, known as YC, travelling to Germany as a tourist. Furthermore, if you hold a residence permit for another Member State, you are also entitled to travel to the other Member States as a tourist for up to 90 days.
But Kim, she’s settled there. She’s not a tourist. I know. And that would, in principle, be the reason why one might side with the city in this matter. However, that’s only valid until a new situation arises.
What happens is that she becomes pregnant and gives birth to a child who acquires German citizenship through his father. Despite this, the authorities in Wuppertal still want her deported from the country. They do believe the child can come with her, as they’ll only be out of the country for about a month, and then they’ll be back in on a new – this time German – visa.
This raises the question of when YC’s rights under Article 20 TFEU actually come into effect. Is it when the child is born? Is it when the local authorities ‘grant’ her a residence permit? Or when exactly?
The Danish government has submitted a detailed submission to the Court of Justice on this very issue. The Danish Government is entirely convinced that these rights only take effect once the authorities grant the right of residence. The Government justifies this by pointing out that it is the Court of Justice itself which has used the term ‘granting’ in several previous cases, and therefore the residence permit is, by its very nature, a legal act.
In principle, the authorities in the city of Wuppertal take the same approach to the matter. Nevertheless, the Administrative Court in Düsseldorf wishes to have a clear answer to precisely this question.
The Court readily answered the question, but what is worth noting subsequently is that the judgment was delivered on 8 May 2025, and to this day the Danish authorities have not brought their practices into line with the answer. They stubbornly maintain that the residence permit is the legal basis, meaning that rights only arise once the authorities ‘grant’ the right of residence.
So what does the Court actually say?
The Court begins by stating that it is not sufficient for there to be a family relationship between the child and the third-country national. There must also be a relationship of dependency between them. The Court has explained in previous cases that this relationship of dependency must be emotional, social and financial. In this case, the child does not have much contact with his father, and it is therefore YC who is the child’s primary carer.
Where such a relationship of dependency exists between the third-country national and the child, that third-country national must be granted a right of residence on the basis of the child and, consequently, Article 20 TFEU.
In paragraph 29 of the judgment, the Court goes a step further and states that if the third-country national cannot obtain a right of residence under other provisions, such as national rules on family reunification, and that third-country national is thereby de facto required to leave the country, with the consequence that the child is forced to return to that parent’s country of origin, then Article 20 TFEU kicks in, and the parent must be granted a right of residence under that Article.
The argument put forward by the German authorities is, as mentioned earlier, that YC is ‘compelled’ to return home to apply for a visa for Germany, and with that she can then return and obtain a right of residence under Article 20 TFEU. The child can certainly cope with travelling for the month or so that this takes. It won’t kill the child.
Wrong, replies the Court of Justice. Her derived right of residence stems directly from the Treaty, and a new visa makes no difference whatsoever. The Court of Justice states explicitly that the German authorities have no legal basis for requiring her to return home first. She has the right to be there on account of the child, and the national authorities cannot change that.
In paragraph 32, the Court of Justice even states that the derived right of residence is entirely independent of whether or not the national authorities issue a residence permit. This is a very important point, particularly in light of the original question as to when the derived rights actually take effect. The Court compares this to the residence card issued to third-country nationals under the Citizenship Directive 2004/38, and where Article 25 of that Directive states that neither an application for, a receipt for an application for, nor the possession of a residence card is in any way a condition for the person to be able to exercise their rights as a family member of a Union citizen.
The Court of Justice can therefore conclude that the residence permit does not create a right. Rather, it is of a declaratory nature. The entire argument put forward by the Danish Government falls flat at this very point.
The next question addressed by the Court of Justice is whether this right of residence arises when an application for a residence permit is made. The answer to this is no. In paragraphs 37 and 38, the Court states that the derived right takes effect at the very moment the relationship of dependency arises, which, in this specific case, means from the second the child is born. However, there may be circumstances in which it only arises at a later date, and it is therefore for the national authorities to determine the point in time at which this relationship of dependency arose.
One example of a situation where it may come into effect later is where the child and the third-country national are staying in a third country and enter a Member State from there. In such a case, this relationship of dependency will come into effect the moment they arrive in that Member State.
The final question referred to the Court of Justice is whether the right of residence under Article 20 TFEU may be made subject to a national provision requiring that a prior visa must first be obtained ‘at home’. The Court of Justice rejects this in very clear terms.
Link to the judgment in Case C-130/24, YC v Stadt Wuppertal:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2024CJ0130
The Danish Government’s submission to the Court of Justice (only available in Danish):
https://infocuria.curia.europa.eu/tabs/ ... 4-DA-1-pdf
We are dealing with a woman who first entered Poland legally for the purpose of studying. From there, she travelled on to Germany a little later, where she settled in the German city of Wuppertal. However, the city’s population register will not recognise her residence, which they consider to be illegal. They justify this on the grounds that she has not applied for a visa for Germany.
We could stop here and put forward two arguments to support this. The first is that third-country nationals do not have an independent right to free movement within the Union, so in that respect one might well side with the city. On the other hand, we have an earlier ruling known as MRAX, which establishes that a visa for a country within the Schengen Area is, in principle, valid for the ENTIRE Schengen Area, and not just for the country for which it was issued. And since both Poland and Germany are part of this cooperation, there should be no obstacle to this woman, known as YC, travelling to Germany as a tourist. Furthermore, if you hold a residence permit for another Member State, you are also entitled to travel to the other Member States as a tourist for up to 90 days.
But Kim, she’s settled there. She’s not a tourist. I know. And that would, in principle, be the reason why one might side with the city in this matter. However, that’s only valid until a new situation arises.
What happens is that she becomes pregnant and gives birth to a child who acquires German citizenship through his father. Despite this, the authorities in Wuppertal still want her deported from the country. They do believe the child can come with her, as they’ll only be out of the country for about a month, and then they’ll be back in on a new – this time German – visa.
This raises the question of when YC’s rights under Article 20 TFEU actually come into effect. Is it when the child is born? Is it when the local authorities ‘grant’ her a residence permit? Or when exactly?
The Danish government has submitted a detailed submission to the Court of Justice on this very issue. The Danish Government is entirely convinced that these rights only take effect once the authorities grant the right of residence. The Government justifies this by pointing out that it is the Court of Justice itself which has used the term ‘granting’ in several previous cases, and therefore the residence permit is, by its very nature, a legal act.
In principle, the authorities in the city of Wuppertal take the same approach to the matter. Nevertheless, the Administrative Court in Düsseldorf wishes to have a clear answer to precisely this question.
The Court readily answered the question, but what is worth noting subsequently is that the judgment was delivered on 8 May 2025, and to this day the Danish authorities have not brought their practices into line with the answer. They stubbornly maintain that the residence permit is the legal basis, meaning that rights only arise once the authorities ‘grant’ the right of residence.
So what does the Court actually say?
The Court begins by stating that it is not sufficient for there to be a family relationship between the child and the third-country national. There must also be a relationship of dependency between them. The Court has explained in previous cases that this relationship of dependency must be emotional, social and financial. In this case, the child does not have much contact with his father, and it is therefore YC who is the child’s primary carer.
Where such a relationship of dependency exists between the third-country national and the child, that third-country national must be granted a right of residence on the basis of the child and, consequently, Article 20 TFEU.
In paragraph 29 of the judgment, the Court goes a step further and states that if the third-country national cannot obtain a right of residence under other provisions, such as national rules on family reunification, and that third-country national is thereby de facto required to leave the country, with the consequence that the child is forced to return to that parent’s country of origin, then Article 20 TFEU kicks in, and the parent must be granted a right of residence under that Article.
The argument put forward by the German authorities is, as mentioned earlier, that YC is ‘compelled’ to return home to apply for a visa for Germany, and with that she can then return and obtain a right of residence under Article 20 TFEU. The child can certainly cope with travelling for the month or so that this takes. It won’t kill the child.
Wrong, replies the Court of Justice. Her derived right of residence stems directly from the Treaty, and a new visa makes no difference whatsoever. The Court of Justice states explicitly that the German authorities have no legal basis for requiring her to return home first. She has the right to be there on account of the child, and the national authorities cannot change that.
In paragraph 32, the Court of Justice even states that the derived right of residence is entirely independent of whether or not the national authorities issue a residence permit. This is a very important point, particularly in light of the original question as to when the derived rights actually take effect. The Court compares this to the residence card issued to third-country nationals under the Citizenship Directive 2004/38, and where Article 25 of that Directive states that neither an application for, a receipt for an application for, nor the possession of a residence card is in any way a condition for the person to be able to exercise their rights as a family member of a Union citizen.
The Court of Justice can therefore conclude that the residence permit does not create a right. Rather, it is of a declaratory nature. The entire argument put forward by the Danish Government falls flat at this very point.
The next question addressed by the Court of Justice is whether this right of residence arises when an application for a residence permit is made. The answer to this is no. In paragraphs 37 and 38, the Court states that the derived right takes effect at the very moment the relationship of dependency arises, which, in this specific case, means from the second the child is born. However, there may be circumstances in which it only arises at a later date, and it is therefore for the national authorities to determine the point in time at which this relationship of dependency arose.
One example of a situation where it may come into effect later is where the child and the third-country national are staying in a third country and enter a Member State from there. In such a case, this relationship of dependency will come into effect the moment they arrive in that Member State.
The final question referred to the Court of Justice is whether the right of residence under Article 20 TFEU may be made subject to a national provision requiring that a prior visa must first be obtained ‘at home’. The Court of Justice rejects this in very clear terms.
Link to the judgment in Case C-130/24, YC v Stadt Wuppertal:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2024CJ0130
The Danish Government’s submission to the Court of Justice (only available in Danish):
https://infocuria.curia.europa.eu/tabs/ ... 4-DA-1-pdf
Senest rettet af Kim P. Nyberg 30.08.2026 16:32:24, rettet i alt 1 gang.
Frivillig rådgiver i Ægteskab Uden Grænser
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Kim P. Nyberg
- Indlæg: 3510
- Tilmeldt: 02.02.2009 11:41:42
- Geografisk sted: Herning
- Kontakt:
Re: Full AO1 walk-through
It doesn’t always have to be easy, though. We are looking at a case where a third-country national was granted a residence permit on the basis of work in Spain. In 2014, she married a Dutch national in Morocco, and apart from a few holidays and weekends in Spain, they spent most of their time together in the Netherlands. Note here that she does not apply for a Dutch residence permit. She still holds her Spanish one.
The following year, they have a child together, and this child is exclusively a Dutch national. The child turns out to have a disability and, for example, does not speak a single word during the first five years of life. The mother now decides to apply for a residence permit on the child’s behalf, but the Dutch authorities put a stop to this. When she cites Article 20 TFEU to the Dutch authorities, they are very dismissive. She is not at all entitled to such a residence permit. Besides, she does have a Spanish residence permit, so she can just pop down there. There is no reason for her to be here, they argue.
When the case comes before the Court of Justice, the Dutch authorities are faced with three questions. The first question is whether the Dutch authorities have consulted the Spanish authorities to find out whether the Spanish residence permit is still valid. Well, no, we haven’t exactly done that. Right, have you then checked whether Spain would accept not just the mother, but the whole family? Well, no, we haven’t exactly done that either. Wouldn’t it be a good idea to sort that sort of thing out before you issue orders to leave the country? Well, yes, it might actually be a good idea. Right, so we agree.
But the Court doesn’t stop there. The local authorities must also investigate whether a move to another Member State would have negative consequences for the child’s mental well-being. The authorities cannot, therefore, focus solely on whether the child will be leaving the Union entirely or not. They must simply carry out a thorough examination of all the circumstances before drawing any conclusions regarding expulsion.
The Netherlands is being given one last slap on the wrist: a residence permit under Article 20 TFEU is in fact possible when there are minor children of both parents who are Union citizens. You can stop this very blunt rejection of this woman. She must be granted a residence permit.
Link to the judgment in Case C-147/24, Safi
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2024CJ0147
Opinion of Advocate General T. Ćapeta delivered on 4 September 2025:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2024CC0147
The following year, they have a child together, and this child is exclusively a Dutch national. The child turns out to have a disability and, for example, does not speak a single word during the first five years of life. The mother now decides to apply for a residence permit on the child’s behalf, but the Dutch authorities put a stop to this. When she cites Article 20 TFEU to the Dutch authorities, they are very dismissive. She is not at all entitled to such a residence permit. Besides, she does have a Spanish residence permit, so she can just pop down there. There is no reason for her to be here, they argue.
When the case comes before the Court of Justice, the Dutch authorities are faced with three questions. The first question is whether the Dutch authorities have consulted the Spanish authorities to find out whether the Spanish residence permit is still valid. Well, no, we haven’t exactly done that. Right, have you then checked whether Spain would accept not just the mother, but the whole family? Well, no, we haven’t exactly done that either. Wouldn’t it be a good idea to sort that sort of thing out before you issue orders to leave the country? Well, yes, it might actually be a good idea. Right, so we agree.
But the Court doesn’t stop there. The local authorities must also investigate whether a move to another Member State would have negative consequences for the child’s mental well-being. The authorities cannot, therefore, focus solely on whether the child will be leaving the Union entirely or not. They must simply carry out a thorough examination of all the circumstances before drawing any conclusions regarding expulsion.
The Netherlands is being given one last slap on the wrist: a residence permit under Article 20 TFEU is in fact possible when there are minor children of both parents who are Union citizens. You can stop this very blunt rejection of this woman. She must be granted a residence permit.
Link to the judgment in Case C-147/24, Safi
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2024CJ0147
Opinion of Advocate General T. Ćapeta delivered on 4 September 2025:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2024CC0147
Senest rettet af Kim P. Nyberg 30.08.2026 16:35:40, rettet i alt 1 gang.
Frivillig rådgiver i Ægteskab Uden Grænser
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Kim P. Nyberg
- Indlæg: 3510
- Tilmeldt: 02.02.2009 11:41:42
- Geografisk sted: Herning
- Kontakt:
Re: Full AO1 walk-through
We’re moving on to what is, for the time being, the most recent concluded case at the Court of Justice in this series of cases. At present, there is two further cases which has been referred to the Advocate General but is still awaiting the judges’ final deliberations. I’ll post an update on that as soon as that has taken place.
A short while ago, we were introduced to PQ, who had his share of problems with the Hungarian authorities. We shall be meeting him again, as the disputes are not yet over.
The referring court has quite a number of questions for the Court of Justice, but essentially three of them are the most important. The first is whether a Member State’s security authorities can have a foreign national deported simply by stating that they pose a security risk, without providing any further justification. It should be noted here that absolutely no one other than the security authorities has access to these grounds. No one in the court proceedings – neither the immigration authorities, the prosecutor, the defence lawyer nor the judge – can gain any insight into the information beyond the statement that the accused poses a security risk.
The second question is this: even when the authorities are well aware in advance that the defendant has family and young children in the country, can they simply ignore this information and still demand deportation, an entry ban and so on? In this context, does it make any difference if the defendant themselves draws attention to these matters during the trial?
And the final question is this: if the country’s highest court has ruled that all lower courts must follow a specific procedure without the possibility of deviating from it – even if this procedure is in direct contravention of both EU legislation and rulings by the Court of Justice of the European Union – are these lower courts still bound by this procedure?
It is perhaps not surprising, given the regime Hungary has had until recently, that they would interfere in everything. Thus, the Hungarian Government has sought to reformulate some of the questions put to the Court because the original wording ‘does not quite fit’ into our narrative. The Court categorically rejects the government’s argument and states that it must rule solely on the questions posed by the referring court, and not on what third parties wish to see included. So the Hungarian government can keep its mouth shut.
With regard to the second question mentioned above, the Court replies that once dependency has commenced – which it did at the children’s birth – a Member State cannot expel the third-country national, regardless of the grounds, for as long as that dependency persists; see also paragraphs 98 and 99 of the judgment. And this takes precedence over everything else. It is also apparent from the case that the Hungarian authorities want him out of the Union altogether and back to his home country. The Court says, ‘Forget it, you cannot do that’.
And no, the authorities cannot simply gloss over the whole matter and proceed directly to deportation. There are obligations on both sides here. The defendant has a duty to provide information about his family situation as early as possible in the proceedings, and the authorities MUST take this information into account as the case progresses. And the authorities must carry out a detailed investigation into all the circumstances of the case, rather than just looking at it through a narrow lens. Here, the authorities must, on their own initiative, investigate whether this is an Article 20 TFEU case, even without the accused specifically having to mention Article 20 TFEU by name.
With regard to the first question mentioned above, the immigration authorities and the courts must have insight into the basis for the security assessment in question. They do not necessarily need to know everything, but at least enough to ensure that a fair trial can be conducted. After all, they cannot simply deport him just because he is wearing red trousers and the security service does not like it. But that is precisely the situation we find ourselves in, because the security service refuses to come clean.
And with regard to the third question mentioned above, the Court of Justice replies that, regardless of whether a higher court has introduced a mandatory procedure which conflicts with both the EU rules themselves and the interpretations provided by the Court of Justice, all of the country’s courts must, first and foremost, comply with EU rules and thus set aside the mandatory procedure. No matter how much the country’s Supreme Court tries to downplay EU rules in an attempt to promote its own rules, EU law always takes precedence. This has been the case since 1964.
Link to the judgment in Case C-26/25, Bukla:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2025CJ0026
A short while ago, we were introduced to PQ, who had his share of problems with the Hungarian authorities. We shall be meeting him again, as the disputes are not yet over.
The referring court has quite a number of questions for the Court of Justice, but essentially three of them are the most important. The first is whether a Member State’s security authorities can have a foreign national deported simply by stating that they pose a security risk, without providing any further justification. It should be noted here that absolutely no one other than the security authorities has access to these grounds. No one in the court proceedings – neither the immigration authorities, the prosecutor, the defence lawyer nor the judge – can gain any insight into the information beyond the statement that the accused poses a security risk.
The second question is this: even when the authorities are well aware in advance that the defendant has family and young children in the country, can they simply ignore this information and still demand deportation, an entry ban and so on? In this context, does it make any difference if the defendant themselves draws attention to these matters during the trial?
And the final question is this: if the country’s highest court has ruled that all lower courts must follow a specific procedure without the possibility of deviating from it – even if this procedure is in direct contravention of both EU legislation and rulings by the Court of Justice of the European Union – are these lower courts still bound by this procedure?
It is perhaps not surprising, given the regime Hungary has had until recently, that they would interfere in everything. Thus, the Hungarian Government has sought to reformulate some of the questions put to the Court because the original wording ‘does not quite fit’ into our narrative. The Court categorically rejects the government’s argument and states that it must rule solely on the questions posed by the referring court, and not on what third parties wish to see included. So the Hungarian government can keep its mouth shut.
With regard to the second question mentioned above, the Court replies that once dependency has commenced – which it did at the children’s birth – a Member State cannot expel the third-country national, regardless of the grounds, for as long as that dependency persists; see also paragraphs 98 and 99 of the judgment. And this takes precedence over everything else. It is also apparent from the case that the Hungarian authorities want him out of the Union altogether and back to his home country. The Court says, ‘Forget it, you cannot do that’.
And no, the authorities cannot simply gloss over the whole matter and proceed directly to deportation. There are obligations on both sides here. The defendant has a duty to provide information about his family situation as early as possible in the proceedings, and the authorities MUST take this information into account as the case progresses. And the authorities must carry out a detailed investigation into all the circumstances of the case, rather than just looking at it through a narrow lens. Here, the authorities must, on their own initiative, investigate whether this is an Article 20 TFEU case, even without the accused specifically having to mention Article 20 TFEU by name.
With regard to the first question mentioned above, the immigration authorities and the courts must have insight into the basis for the security assessment in question. They do not necessarily need to know everything, but at least enough to ensure that a fair trial can be conducted. After all, they cannot simply deport him just because he is wearing red trousers and the security service does not like it. But that is precisely the situation we find ourselves in, because the security service refuses to come clean.
And with regard to the third question mentioned above, the Court of Justice replies that, regardless of whether a higher court has introduced a mandatory procedure which conflicts with both the EU rules themselves and the interpretations provided by the Court of Justice, all of the country’s courts must, first and foremost, comply with EU rules and thus set aside the mandatory procedure. No matter how much the country’s Supreme Court tries to downplay EU rules in an attempt to promote its own rules, EU law always takes precedence. This has been the case since 1964.
Link to the judgment in Case C-26/25, Bukla:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content ... 2025CJ0026
Frivillig rådgiver i Ægteskab Uden Grænser